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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Suspension and
Liquidation of Utah Savings and
Loan Association, a Utah corporation,
,V. Smoot Brimhall, Commissioner of
Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah
'
Appellant.

)'
\ No.
,\
) 11172

APPELLAN'f'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the District
Court of Utah County directing that certain funds
deposited with Utah Savings & Loan Association,
which had been received and held separately in trust
for the depositors thereof under authority of Section
7-7-43, U.C.A. 1953, be treated the same as other deposits and assets of the Association in connection with
dividends or other distribution of assets to be authorized
by the Court and that the same not be treated separately
as trust funds.

1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was presented to the lower Court
p ..
h
on
a etition of t e Appellant herein for authority to dis.
burse said funds as trust funds to the depositors thereof
and the Court made its Order directing that such no;
be done.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the Court
and for directions of this Court as to the proper dispo·
sition of said funds.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 5, 1966, W. Smoot Brimhall, the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State
of Utah, (then designated as the Bank Commissioner)
took over the affairs and assets of Utah Savings & Loan
Association, a Utah corporation, engaged in the savings
and loan business, with its principal place of business
in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah (hereinafter
sometimes called the Association), and the District
Court of Utah County, by an Order dated December
16th, 1966, approved the Commissioner's action and
assumed jurisdiction of this proceeding as provided
by law.

"T.

Some time prior to July 1, 1966, the appellant,
Smoot Brimhall, became concerned about the capital
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condition of the Association. (R. 32) On or about July
6, 1966, Appellant learned, through the news media,
of the closing of the Idaho Savings & Loan Association,
an uninsured savings and loan association in Idaho.
He further ,at that time, learned that there was an
unusually heavy demand for withdrawal of savings on
Utah Savings and Loan Association, which he felt was
attributable partly to the closing of the Idaho institution. ( R. 32) On the same date, namely, July 6, 1966,
the Board of Directors of Utah Savings and Loan
Association placed that Association on a limited withdrawal program. (R. 33)
On July 7 ,1966, the Appellant made a determination that there was reason for serious doubt that
investing savers would be able to get a full return on
their savings that they had in the Association, and
further made a determination that there was a danger
that those who were withdrawing funds might get a
disproportionate share of their savings over those shareholders who were not withdrawing funds. (R. 33)
Accordingly, on the evening of July 7, 1966,
Appellant met with the Board of Directors of Utah
Savings and Loan Association, and gave the management verbal orders that they should segregate any new
funds received from that time on and hold them under
supervision of the Banking Department. That verbal
Order was confirmed by writing on .J uy 8, 1966 with
a letter from the Appellant to the Board of Directors
of the Association, which letter read as follows:
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"Gentlemen:
By authority vested in me, by Section 7.7.43
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, you are hereby
ordered to hold all funds received as dues or
other payments on investment shares received
after the opening of business July 7, 1966. These
funds are to be held separately from all other
funds of your association and are to be deposited
or invested under the supervision of this depart
ment. You may invest these funds in any invest·
ment outlet authorized by Section 7-5-11, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. This con·
firms my verbal order given in your office on
July 7, 1966. Very truly yours." (R. 34-35)

All such funds received by the Association as dues
or other payments on investment shares after the open·
ing of business on July 7, 1966 were in fact segregated
and kept in a separate special account opened in the
Walker Bank and Trust Company, and they have
always since been separated, segregated, and separately
identifiable. (R. 35, 35 and 41) The procedure foJ.
lowed in keeping said funds separate was to make a
daily accounting of it, although the money would ac·
tually be put into the special account only every three
or four days. The daily accounting was kept at the
Association,and from these daily accountings they would
make a disbursement over to the special account. (R.
39, 40 and 41)
The Appellant, in connection with his letter of
direction to the Association, intended that the funds
be held in trust for those savers who delivered them to
the Association following the opening of business on
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July 7, 1966, and had he not believed that they would
be so separately held in trust, he would have taken over
the Association under the power granted to him by the
statutes rather than to let the Association continue to
operate and accept funds from the depositors. (R. 35
and 36)
Subsequent to the setting up of the said special
account in which were deposited the funds received
after July 7, 1966, the procedure was to permit withdrawal of such funds by the persons deposting them
in full. ( R. 43, 44, and 45) No interest was paid or
credited upon any of the deposits made subsequent to
.T uly 7, 1966 and which became a part of the special
trust account. (R. 46)
At the time of the Court's Order, there remained
in said special account approximately $544,000.00.
(R. 36)
ARGUMENT I
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE FUNDS ARE NOT TRUST FUNDS
AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE TREATED
THE SAME AS OTHER DUES AND DEPOSITS AND ASSETS OF THE ASSOCIATION.
(a) Sec. 7-2-15 U.C.A. does not prevent the treatment of the funds as trust fwnds under Sec. 7-7-43.
The Court in its conclusions of law stated that
Section 7-7-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, creates no
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superior equity or preference to funds held in trus!
where the savings and loan association is liquidatea
and ~urther concluded that Section 7-2-15 of the Code
reqmres that no preference or priority shall be given
to any claim against a savings and loan association
"exce~t ~uc~ as are ordi~arily incurred in supervising
and hqmdatmg the affa1rs of such institutions and
except such as are otherwise provided by law."
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the funds
involved were accumulated at the direction of the
Appellant Commissioner under authority of the pro·
visions of Section 7-7-43, which Section read as follows:
"Whenever, upon investigation and determi·
nation by the bank commissioner, any building
and loan company under his supervision is, in
his opinion, in such condition that persons invest·
ing money therein will not receive the full return
of their investment with agreed earnings, or so
that nonwithdrawing shareholders are in danger
of not receiving a proportionate interest in the
assets equally with active withdrawing share·
holders, the bank commissioner may, pending
reduction of liabilities or reorganization of such
building and loan company require that with·
drawal payments cease and he may cause all
new money received as dues or other payments
on investment shares by such company to be sep·
arately held or deposited or invested in trwt
under his siipervision and preserved for the pro·
tection of persons making such new inve~~"'!'ents,
and also, pending such reduction of liab1hties .or
reorganization he may exercise such autho!1ty
and jurisdiction and institute such regulations

6
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and contr?l as he. ~ay de~m necessary to prevent
losses or mequahties to mvestors; and if necessary in his opinion and reasonable discretion
he may enter into possession and conserve th~
com.pa~~ .and its assets pending such reduction
of hab1hbes or reorganization and for such time
as he deems reasonable to allow such company
to reduce its liabilities or reorganize." (emphasis
added)
It will be noted that Section 7-2-15 is a part of
the chapter on suspension and liquidation of institutions
under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and Section
7-7-43 is a section under the chapter devoted expressly
to building and loan corporations. Section 7-2-15 was
enacted in 1927, whereas Section 7-7-43, was enacted
thereafter in 1935. We submit that if there is any conflict between the two, that the one later enacted should
take preference. We further submit that the two
statutes are not inconsistent, however, by reason of
the proviso in 7-2-15 that such preferences should not
be given, "except such as are otherwise provided by
law". Surely, the procedures authorized in Section
7-7-43 does provide for the setting up of the trust funds
and the handling of the same preferentially, so that
these clearly are "otherwise provided by law".
It does not appear that any case has been decided
directly interpreting the l?-rovisions of Section 7-7-43,
as above quoted by the Utah Courts nor so far as we
can find by the court of any jurisdiction. It appears,
however, that the statute itself is clear enough as to its
purposes and intent so that no conclusion properly can

7
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be drawn other than that such funds so held in tru~t
are the sole property of the persons who remitted thi
same, and are not to be commingled with, or becomt
a part of the assets of the association, whether whili
said association continued to endeavor to extricati
itself from its difficulties, or after assumption of the
assets thereof by the Bank Commissioner, under hiJ
statutory authority. Were it otherwise, there wou]Q
be no purpose in holding these funds separate ano
apart.
The statute states that such funds shall be "sepa·
ra tely held or deposited or invested in trust . . . ano
preserved for the protection of persons making sucn
new investments". We can conceive of no clearer Ian·
guage to indicate the responsibilities as relate to sucn
monies, the purposes of so holding the same, and the
ownership thereto, upon failure of the association to
have adjusted its liabilities and circumstances within
a reasonable time and prior to taking over of the assen
of the association by the Bank Commissioner.
Clearly, under the statute, these are trust fundi.
The uniform and simple definition of a trust is:
"The legal relationship between one person
having an equitable ownership in property ana
another person owning the legal title to sucf1
property, the equitable ownership of the form~r
entitling him to the performance of certam
powers by the latter, which ~er\?rmance can be
compelled in a court of eqmty.
54 Am . .Tur., Trusts, Section 4.
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The statute clearly contemplates that the association receiving such funds, after directions by the
Commissioner, shall, as to such funds, be trustee; that
as to such funds the persons remitting the funds shall
be cestui que trusts; that the funds themselves shall be
trust funds held for the said cestu que tru~ts and specifically as the statute states "preserved for the protection
of the persons making such new investments".
The Commissioner having concluded that a reasonable time had elapsed and having taken possession of the properties and assets of the association
as contemplated by Section 7-7-44, and Title 7, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the purpose of the
trust has ceased. The cestui que trust would be entitled,
by an action in a Court of equity, to a return to them
of the trust funds; and hence, it would appear to be
the obligation of the Commissioner to make a return of said funds to the owners thereof for whom
they were held under the statute, without the necessity
for any suit or demand, as rapidly as possible so as
to avoid any further loss of interest or use of said funds
by the owners thereof.
In the absence of some specific interpretation of
our statute, it is helpful to consider the rule as relates
to ownership and the rights to have returned intact
deposits made in a bank, which at the time of such
deposit, was insolvent to the knowledge of the officers
or directors thereof. The general rule with regard to
that matter is that acceptance of general deposits by
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•

a ~ank which is insolvent, to the knowledge of ih
off1cers, constitutes a fraud as will entitle the unsus.
pecti_ng depositor to rescind and recover back the money,
or give him a preferential claim, or create a trust ex
maleficio. This rule and numerous supporting cases are
set forth in annotations in 25 A.L.R., Page 128, ano
a superseding annotation on Page 1078, 81 A.L.R.
We do recognize that there are cases as relates
to building and loan associations which hold, in the
absence of statute, that where people had become mem·
hers of an association and made deposits in their savingi
accounts as the result of fraudulent representations as
to the solvency of the corporation, that such deposit!
were not entitled to priority and were not held in trust.
The reason of such ruling is that the controlling prin·
cipal of savings and loan associations is mutuality.
Furthermore, as stated in an annotation at 100 A.L.R.,
page 573, the solvency of a building and loan association
is sui generis. Such insolvency consists of such condi·
tion as reducing the available and collectible assets
below the level of the stock already paid in and makes
it impossible for the association to pay back to its
stockholders the amount of their contributions. It does
not consist of the inability to pay its outside debts,
but merely the inability to satisfy the demands of ii!
own member.s. Thus, the members of a defunct building
and loan asociation are generally its chief, if not ii!
only creditors.
It may well have been that this unusual circum·
stance as relates to the position of building and loan

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

associations and their relationship to their shareholders,
and the trend of some decided cases as relates to such
deposits, was the controllng reason for the enactment
by our Legislature of Section 7-7-43, so as to protect
the funds of shareholders who might tender the same
during an interim period when it was known to all
concerned (except perhaps the persons tendering the
funds) that immediately upon receipt of the same into
the general assets of the association the depositor would
automatically lose a substantial part thereof because
of the financial instability of the association.
Even in the absence of specific statutory direction
as relates to the return of these funds, in view of the
very clear and express statutory direction that the same
shall be held separately in trust and specifically that
the purpose of the trust is to preserve those funds for
the protection of the persons making such new investments, all of the elements are present which would
sustain an action by the cestiu que trusts for a preferential claim as relates to such funds. See Harry E.
Jones, Inc., vs. Kemp, (C.C.A. Cal.) 74 F. 2d, 623.
( b) The funds did not lose their character as trust
funds by commingling with other funds.

One of the further conclusions of law of the Court
which it arrived at in support of its Decree and Order
was that in no event could the special fund maintained
at Walker Bank and Trust Company be deemed to
have created a special trust fund entitling the depositors to preferential treatment with regard thereto,
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because the funds were commingled with other funds
belonging to the Association. This is definitely an
erroneous conclusion of law. The doctrine of commin.
gling of assets, so as to result in a loss of the character
of the assets or a deprivation of the rights of the owners
therein, results only where there cannot be an identifi.
cation, either in kind or amount. As stated in 1 Am.
Jur. 2d, page 275, Accession and Confusion, Section 3:
"The doctrine of confusion of goods only ap·
plies where the quantity and value of the prop·
erty of each owner cannot be determined. In
general, it may be said that if the goods of several
persons are intermingled and can be easily dis·
tinguished and separated or if they are of the
same nature and value, although not capable of
actual separation by identifying each particular,
and if the portion of each owner is known and
a division can be made of equal proportionate
value, then each may claim his own, or his aliquot
part, as the case may be ... "
Section 21 under Accession and Confusion in the
same volume states:
"Obviously, there can be no commingling by
the mixing of dollars when the number owned
by each claimant is known, and ~onsequently
in such case there can be no forfeiture of the
separate estate of one party under the com·
mingling doctrine."
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SUMMARY
Every element necessary to the establishment of
a trust fund for the special use and benefit of the persons
making the deposits during the period involved were
present. The procedure was set up in accordance with
specific statutory authority; the Appellant Commissioner intended that the monies be separately kept and
held in trust and preserved for the persons making
such deposits; the deposits would not have been permitted to be received except with the understanding
that they be so kept and held in trust; the said deposits
were in fact separately identified and separately held
in an account separate and apart from the regular
account of the Association; no interest was paid or
accumulated on said deposits as was done in connection
with other deposits; in making payments out on withdrawal request, the full amount of. said deposits was
paid out, without interest; and in all manner the funds
were treated in accordance with the statutory intention,
namely, to keep and preserve them separately for the
benefit of the persons who deposited the same.
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CONCLUSION
We submit that the funds involved were and are
trust funds belonging specially and separately to the
depositors thereof; that the depositors thereof are
entitled to their return in full, without interest; and
that this Court should reverse the Order of the Court
below and should direct the Appellant Commissioner
to forthwith disburse and return said funds to the persons from whom said deposits and funds were received.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General
DAVID K. 'VATKISS, Special
Assistant Attorney General
400 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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